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Production and transport have been unbundled to  expansion:
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provider (the owner of the infrastructure) now often  pricing leads to optimal investment.
differs from the service provider. Chief among the  *  If network provision is monopolistic, congestion
challenges this raises for economists and policymakers:  pricing leads to underinvestment.
to design institutions that lead to "optimal" network  He shows the model applying to power networks as
expansion.  well as to the Internet.
Different arrangements have been suggested, ranging  Policymakers must therefore assess whether network
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1  Introduction
Over  the  last  decade,  network  industries  have  undergone  a dramatic  transformation:  compe-
tition  has  been  introduced  in industries  that  had  long  been  viewed as text-book  examples  of
natural  monopolies,  such as gas,  electricity,  and  telecommunications.  Production  and  trans-
port  have  been  unbundled  to  foster  the  introduction  of competition:  the  capacity  provider,
i.e., the  owner of the infrastructure,  now often  differs from the  service provider.  This  situation
raises  new challenges  for economists  and  policy  makers.  Chief among  them  is the  design  of
institutions  that  will lead  to  "optimal"  network  expansion.  Different arrangements  have been
suggested,  ranging  from indicative  planning  to decentralization  of investment  decisions through
congestion  pricing.  Two questions  lie at  the  core of the  debate:  is the  infrastructure  network
still  a natural  monopoly?  and what  role could congestion  pricing play?  This article  shows how
simple  economic  theory  sheds light on the  argument,  and  informs the  policy discussion.
In the early  80's, network  industries  in most countries were composed of vertically integrated
utilities,  subject  to  some form of governmental  control.  In the  United  Kingdom  and  in South
America  utilities  were  publicly  owned.  In the  United  States  they  were  (for the  most  part)
privately  owned, and  subject  to  regulatory  oversight.
In many  countries,  today's  industrial  organization  is dramatically  different  (see the  survey
by  Klein  [5]).  First,  utilities  (or  more  exactly,  their  successor  companies)  are now privately
owned.  Second, and more importantly  for this analysis,  network industries  are now competitive:
production  and  transport  have  been unbundled,  and  vertical  separation  has  been  introduced.
Usually,  firms compete  to provide  service to  customers,  using the  network  infrastructure  that
often  remains  a monopoly.  In  the  electricity  industry,  the  transmission  and  distribution  net-
works are sofar considered  natural  monopolies, while generation  and retail  sale to customers  are
competitive.  In the  United  Kingdom,  the monopolistic  owner of the  power transmission  grid is
not  involved in generation  nor  retail  sale of electricity,  and  the owner of the railway track  does
not  offer passenger  or freight service.  In the  telecommunications  industry,  the local network  is
(at  least today)  a natural  monopoly',  while long-distance  telecommunications  and value-added
'MCI acknowledged  in July 1997  a loss of $800  million  in its efforts  to penetrate  local  telecommunications
1services are competitive. In the United States, the owner of the local telephone network does
not provide all services  transiting through these lines (internet access,  long distance calls, etc.).
In the gas industry, pipeline construction is competitive.
Introduction of competition has greatly reduced the need for centralized planning and bu-
reaucratic  decision making. However,  residual economic regulation is necessary to foster com-
petition  in the competitive segments, and to insure efficient operation of the non-competitive
segments.  In many aspects, residual regulation is much more subtle and complex than the
traditional  utilities regulation, that  treated the vertical chain that  leads to the user as a black
box, and  was chiefly concerned with regulating the price of the output.  Today, the regula-
tor  must open that  black box, and design regulatory mechanisms that  control one segment of
the chain without compromising the others.  For example, determination of access prices for
the local loop in telecommunications  has generated almost two decades of discussions (see the
theoretical analysis of access  pricing by Laffont and Tirole [8]).
One particular  challenge is the design of an institutional  framework that  ensures optimal
expansion of the network.  Different arrangements have been proposed and/or implemented,
that  we can broadly classify into three categories:  (1) planning by a government entity, (2)
regulation of the network operator, and (3) decentralization of investment decisions supported
by pricing of congestion on the network. In the electricity industry, Brazil has opted for the
first solution, the United Kingdom for the second, and Argentina for the third.
This article applies general economic  principles to determine conditions under which con-
gestion pricing creates optimal investment incentives. The question is crucial for policy makers.
If we find that  congestion pricing yields optimal network expansion, additional regulation is
not needed. On the other hand, if this is not the case, policy makers must set up a regulatory
agency, and endow it with the appropriate tools.
The literature  so far has been divided on this issue: while analysts agree that  congestion
pricing induces optimal usage of the existing network and generates revenue that can be used to
finance network expansion, opposite views are held on the incentives  congestion pricing creates
for decentralized network expansion.
markets. This loss (and  the subsequent  judicial ruling that the FCC has no mandate  to impose  federal  compe-
tition rules  to local  telephone  companies)  suggest  that, contrary  to the vision  of the Telecommunications  Act of
1996,  local  telecommunications  remain  a natural  monopoly.
2All agree that  inclusion of a congestion charge in the price forces users to face the congestion
externality  they  are imposing  on others.  This modifies  their  behavior,  hence increases  the use
of the  existing  capacity.  Pricing  for road  congestion  is the  simplest  example2. If drivers  are
charged  more  to use the  network  during  peak-hour,  they  modify  their  departure  time,  or car-
pool.  Hence,  usage of the existing  highway is more  evenly spread  during  the  day and  capacity
expansion  is less urgent.
As  for  network  expansion,  the  proponents'  argument  goes as  follows: congestion  pricing
signals  the  value  of additional  capacity,  hence  creates  correct  incentives.  MacKie-Mason  and
Varian  [10] study  a simple model of congestion for a telecommunications  network,  and conclude
that:  "optimal  congestion  pricing plays two roles - it efficiently rations  access to the network in
times  of congestion,  and  it sends  the correct  signals  about  capacity  expansion".  In the  power
industry,  Hogan  [3] advocates  the use of Transmission  Congestion  Contracts  to signal the  cost
of congestion,  hence  the value of additional  capacity.
The opponents'  argument  relies on the following:  suppose  the network  owner's revenues are
based  on congestion.  Then, his profit maximization  leads to an increase  rather  than  a decrease
of the  congestion  on  the network.  This view has  been  supported  by  Bushnell and  Stoft  [2] in
the  case  of electricity.
This  article  argues  that  the simplest principle of economics,  embodied  in the opening quote,
applies  to these  seemingly complex network  problems:  competition  and not prices induces opti-
mal  capacity expansion.  Congestion pricing does provide  correct  economic signals for network
expansion.  Without  congestion  pricing,  economic information  needed for expansion is not  pro-
duced,  hence  optimal  expansion  is unlikely to  occur.  However, creation  of economic  signals
constitute  only  part  of the  story.  If  competition  to  provide  additional  network  capacity  is
strong,  congestion  pricing does lead to optimal  network  expansion.  If competition  is weak, and
in the extreme  case, if network provision is monopolistic,  congestion  pricing leads to suboptimal
expansion  of the  network.
Our  argument  proceeds  as follows.  First,  we  show that  the  socially  optimal  network  ex-
pansion  is such  that  the  marginal  cost  of capacity  equals  its  marginal  social value  (i.e.,  the
marginal  value of congestion  reduction  due  to a marginal  increase  in capacity).
2 However,  Singapore  constitutes  the only  documented  example  of road  congestion  pricing.
3Second, as pointed out by Hogan [31  and MacKie-Mason and Varian [10],  the revenue from
congestion pricing measures the value of additional capacity.  Under general assumptions, we
prove that  the congestion revenue is precisely equal to the network capacity times its marginal
social value.
Consider then a network owner who receives this congestion revenue. His optimal capacity
choice requires that  the marginal revenue of capacity equals its marginal cost.  If he builds
an additional unit of capacity, his revenue increases by the marginal value (on the marginal
unit),  while simultaneously the marginal value is lowered (on all inframarginal units). He then
follows a familiar inverse elasticity rule and expands the network less than is socially optimal.
Capacity provision is formally equivalent to Cournot competition3.
On the other hand, if competition for network capacity is strong enough, providers will  com-
pete up to the point where the marginal value of capacity equals its marginal cost. Congestion
pricing and effective  open-entry lead to optimal expansion.
We prove that this framework  encompasses  and reconciles  the apparently conflicting  conges-
tion pricing models presented by Bushnell and Stoft [2]  for power networks, and MacKie-Mason
and  Varian [101  for the Internet.
The rule for policy makers is therefore:  (1) use congestion pricing to  send users signals
about the cost of their usage, and (2) if network expansion is not  competitive, regulate the
network owners to induce them to expand the network.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents  a model of congestion for power
systems. Section 3 presents a model of congestion for the internet, proposed by MacKie-Mason
and  Varian, and shows that  both models are in fact  equivalent.  Section 4 discusses policy
issues. Section 5 concludes.
2  Congestion  on  a  Power  Network
This Section presents a first model of congestion pricing.  It  follows closely Nasser [11], that
builds on the seminal treatment presented by Schweppe et al.  [143.  In this model, congestion
creates a hard constraint.  One segment of the network has a given capacity, that  cannot be
exceeded.  This representation is appropriate for transmission capacity constraints on power
3Capacity  provision  is probably  one  of the most  realistic  examples  of Cournot  competition.
4networks  (see Schweppe et  al.  [14] for more details).
We present  in this  Section a non-mathematical  treatment  of the problem.  For the interested
reader,  supporting  equations  are presented  in the  Appendix.
2.1  A  Simple  Network
Consider  the  two-node  power network  represented  on Figure  1.  Electricity  demand  is located
in the  West node,  while generation  is present  at  both  the West and  East  nodes.  qw and  qE  are
the  power  generations  at  the  West and  East  nodes  respectively,  and  dE is the  power demand
at  the  East  node.  For simplicity, we assume  dE  is constant,  and  without  loss of generality, we
normalize  dE =  1. A transmission  line with  capacity  K  links both  regions.
gw(qw)  and 9E(UE)  are the marginal  costs of power generation  at the  West and East  nodes
respectively.  We assume  that  generation  at  the  West  node  is always  cheaper  (at  the  margin)
than  at  the  East  node.  For example,  hydro-power  is generated  at  the West node, while thermal
power  is produced  at  the  East  node:
gw(qw)  < gE(qE), V(qw, qE)
Finally,  we assume  that  the  DC Load  approximation  holds,  and  that  transmission  losses
are  negligible.
2.2  Optimal  Usage
The market  is organized by a central  market-maker  (often called a  "smart  market").  Generators
bid  the price  at  which  they  are willing to supply  power to the market,  users  the price at  which
they  are  willing  to  buy  power4. The  market-maker  then  runs  the  computer  algorithm  that
maximizes  the surplus  from consumption  net of generation  costs,  subject  to the market  clearing
and  the  transmission  constraint  conditions.
We assume perfect  competition  in consumption  and generation:  consumers  truthfully  report
their  demand  function  and  generators  their  supply function,  at  no cost for the market-maker5.
Suppose  first  that  the  transmission  capacity  K  exceeds demand  at  the  East  node:  K  > 1.
The  optimal  dispatch  calls for the cheaper  West generators  to meet  all demand:  qw =  dB =  1,
'More  generally,  participants  in the market bid  a price/quantity  schedule:  supply  function for generators,
demand  function  for  generators.
5 "Gaming" from generators is examined in Nasser [11], Chapters  3 and 4.
5and q  = 0.
Suppose now that  the  transmission  capacity  is lower than  demand  at the  East  Node:  K  < 1.
The optimal  dispatch,  represented  in Figure  2, calls for the cheaper generators  at the West node
to  generate  only  qw =  K,  while the more  expensive  generators  in the  East  node  generate  the
residual quantity  qE  =  1 - K.
Congestion  in  the  transmission  network  implies  that  more  expensive  generators  must  be
turned  on.
2.3  Marginal  Value  of Transmission  Capacities
To determine  the  marginal  value  of transmission  capacity,  consider  a marginal  increase  of one
unit  in transmission  capacity.  This  enables  the  smart-market  to  substitute  one  unit  of cheap
power generated  at  the West node for one unit  of expensive  power generated  at  the  East  node,
which leads  to:
Result  1  The  marginal value  of transmission  capacity is the difference  between the  marginal
costs  of generation  at the  extremities  of the transmission  line.
Furthermore,  since  generation  costs  are increasing,  the  marginal  value of transmission  ca-
pacity  is  decreasing  when  capacity  is  increasing,  as illustrated  on  Figure  3:  an  increase  in
capacity  of the  congested  facility increases  the  net  surplus,  at  a decreasing  rate.  This  math-
ematical  result  has  a strong  economic  interpretation:  prices  reflect scarcity.  As transmission
capacity  becomes  more  abundant,  its  marginal  value  decreases.  In particular,  the  marginal
value  of capacity  on a uncongested  transmission  line is equal to  zero.
Result  1 allows  us to  characterize  the  optimal  transmission  capacity  K*.  An increase  in
transmission  capacity  allows the  dispatcher  to  substitute  cheap  for expensive  power.  On the
other  hand,  it is costly:
Result  2  At  the  optimal  capacity K*,  the marginal  value  of capacity equals its  marginal cost.
Result  2 implies that,  if the marginal  cost of transmission  capacity  is positive,  the line must
be congested  a fraction  of the  time  at  the  optimum.  If a  transmission  line is never  congested,
it is over-sized.
6Residual congestion at the optimum appears consistent with engineering  design standards.
In Brazil, transmission lines are dimensioned to be congested 5% of the time. However,  Result
2 suggests that  the optimal congestion level is not  arbitrarily set to 5%, but depends on the
cost of congestion, i.e., ultimately the marginal cost of generation, as well as users' wilingness
to pay for power.
2.4  Congestion  Pricing
We now turn  to electricity  and  congestion  pricing.  Pw  is the price  of power at  the  West node,
i.e.  the  price  at  which the  smart-market  purchases  power from the  West  generators.  PE is the
price  of power at  the East  node, i.e.  the price  at which the  smart-market  purchases  power from
the  East  generators,  and  sells it to the  consumers.  If the network  is not congested,  the  price of
power  at  the  East  and  West nodes  is simply the  marginal  cost of power generated  at  the  West
node: PE = PW =  9(l).
Suppose  now that  the  network  is congested,  and  that  congestion  is not  priced:  the  smart-
market  buys  power  at  marginal  cost  from  the  West  and  East  generators,  and  sells it at  the
average  marginal  cost  of generating  power and  breaks  even:
PE.1 = Kgw  + (1-  K)gE
Suppose  now that  congestion is priced.  Since the transmission  line is congested,  a marginal
electricity  demand  at  the  East  Node  can be met  only by  using  expensive  power generated  at
the  East  node:  the optimal  price of power  at  the  East  node is pE =  gE(qE).
Users  at  the  East  node  pay  a  price  higher  than  the  average marginal  cost  of generation:
PE  >  PE, to  account  for their contribution  to  congestion.
Furthermore,  we can verify that:
pE = PE  +  (gE  -gw)K
The optimal  price of power at the East  node is the average marginal  cost of power generation
plus  a congestion  charge, equal  to the  transmission  capacity  times  its  marginal value6:
Result  3  Optimal pricing  of electricity  implies  a transmission  charge equal to the transmission
capacity  times  its marginal value: the  congestion  rent.
6This result is a duality equation, and is extremely general.
7The transmission charge varies with the congestion level.
Suppose that  a profit-maximizing  private firm owns the transmission lines, and receives the
transmission capacity times its marginal value. We prove in the Appendix (Proposition 1) that:
Result  4  The profit-maximizing transmission capacity is lower than the socially optimal one..
This result has an intuitive economic interpretation,  independent of the network context:
the producer of a good knows that, if he produces one more unit of the good, he earns the price
of the good on that  last unit, but, if he cannot price-discriminate among consumers, he also
reduces the price he obtains on all inframarginal units.  Congestion pricing in power systems
does not induce optimal expansion. Competition to provide transmission, or residual regulation
of transmission companies are needed.
3  Congestion  on  the  Internet
This Section presents the model of congestion pricing developed by MacKie-Mason  and Varian
[101. Here, congestion does not create a hard constraint, rather it produces delays. However,
as shown below, the economic  intuition is unchanged.
3.1  Notation
We consider the simple model of the Internet presented on Figure 4: two users are connected
to the network. ql and q2 are the network usages for users 1 and 2 respectively (e.g., number
of bits  transmitted).  Q = q, + q2 is the total network usage, K is the network capacity, and
Y = Q/K  is the network utilization.
Congestion creates delay D on the network. We suppose that D is an increasing function of
the network utilization Y:  delay D increases when the usage Q increases, and decreases  when
capacity K increases.
3.2  Marginal  Value of Capacity
Since an increase in network capacity reduces delay, we immediately have:
Result  5  The marginal value of network capacity equals the maryinal delay reduction (implied
by capacity increase). The optimal network capacity is such that the marginal cost of capacity
8equals the marginal  delay reduction.
This  result  is similar  to  Results  1 and  2 for power  systems.  We show in the  Appendix  B
that  the  marginal  value of capacity  decreases  when  capacity  increases.
3.3  Optimal  Usage  and  Congestion  Pricing
Suppose  first  that  users  pay  only a  fixed-fee, independent  of their  network  use.  We show in
the  Appendix  B that  users  then  consume  up  to  the  point  where  the  marginal  utility  from
consumption  equals zero:  users consume  almost  an infinite  amount.
This  result  explains  the misfortune  encountered  by  America  On Line when it introduced  a
new pricing  plan:  unlimited  access to  the service for  $19.95 per  month.  Many  users stayed  too
long  on-line,  and  the network  became  awfully congested.
Suppose  now that  the  network  operator  can compute  the marginal  delay created  by usage,
and  that  users  pay  a congestion  charge  precisely  equal  to that  marginal  delay.  McKie-Mason
and  Varian  [10] propose  a scheme that  links priority  and  congestion  pricing:  each information
packet  contains  a  header,  into  which  a  priority  code  can  be  coded.  Each  router  would then
drop  or  delay  lower priority  packets  at  congested  periods  and  this  would  then  be  the  basis
for charging.  Higher priority  packets  would pay  for this  prioritizing  on a statistically  sampled
basis.  We then  have:
Result  6  If  users  are charged their  marginal  contribution  to  congestion,  they  consume  opti-
mally.
This result  is the application  to the  Internet  of an extremely  general property,  that  has long
been  known  to economists.7
Suppose  the network  operator  collects these  charges.  We have:
Result  7  The  revenue from  congestion pricing  equals the capacity times  its marginal value.
We now examine  network  expansion:
'At  least since Pigou formalized  issues of externalities in 1920.
9Result  8  If  network  operators  compete perfectly,  they  choose:  (1)  the optimal  network  capac-
ity,  and  (2)  the  optimal  congestion  charge. If  the  network  operator is a monopoly,  he chooses
a network  capacity lower than the  optimum  (Propositions  2 and S  in Appendix  B).
Thus,  even though  they  appear different,  congestion  on the internet  and on a power network
involve the same fundamental  economic principle:  the value of a good increases with its scarcity.
In fact  both  models  of congestion  are  equivalent.  Consider  for  example  congestion  at  an
airport.  Delay experienced  by travellers increases  with  the number  of planes.  It seems that  the
delay  model  of congestion  is appropriate.  However, in practice  air  traffic  controllers  set  firm
limits  on the  number  of take-offs per minute,  etc.  The fixed capacity  model of congestion then
seems  correct.
4  Policy  Issues
From  the  previous  discussion,  we propose  the  following  rule  for  policy makers:  (1)  use con-
gestion  pricing  to send users  signals about  the  true  cost  of their  usage,  and  (2) if the  network
expansion  is not  competitive,  regulate  the network  owners  to  induce  them  to expand  the net-
work.  This  Section  discusses  implementation  issues  reduced  to  smart  markets,  congestion
pricing,  competition,  and  regulation  in network  provision.
4.1  Smart  Markets
Smart  markets  are easier to set up when the network  has  historically  been centrally  controlled:
in  Chile,  the  United  Kingdom,  Norway, Argentina,  Colombia,  New Zealand,  the State  of Vic-
toria  in  Australia,  Pools  coordinate  electricity  trades.  In Norway, a smart  market  to  allocate
rights  to  railway  track  is under  examination.
In  other  instances,  creation  of a smart  market  is more  difficult.  The  restructuring  of the
power industry  in California has given rise to a lengthy  and  vigorous  debate  about  the benefits
and  costs  of a smart  market  (Joskow [4]  provides  an insightful  account  of the discussion).  Some
feared  that  the market-maker  would abuse  his monopoly  power  (Wu et al.  [15] and  Oren  et al.
[12]).  For example,  if the market-maker  also owns the network  and  receives the congestion rent,
he has  incentives  to distort  the dispatch  to maximize  his revenues.  For many  power systems,
10the  dispatch  room  is physically  located  within  the transmission  company, which fuels the  fear
that  the network  owner influences the market-maker.
These  concerns  do  not  undermine  the  economic  benefits  of a smart  market.  They  simply
imply  that  important  institutional  issues must  be  carefully  addressed:  coordination  between
the  market-maker  and  the  network  owner,  procedures  of appeal  of the  market-maker's  deci-
sions, mechanisms  to modify  the  market-maker's  procedures,  etc.  The market-maker  must  be
independent  from  the  network  owner.  The  computer  program  that  determines  the  optimal
dispatch  must  be available  to, and auditable  by, all market  participants.  Proper  incentives and
govemnance structure  must  be put  in  place.  In  particular,  the  market  maker's  remuneration
should  be unrelated  to  the dispatch8.
In the  case  of telecommunications  networks,  the  dispatch  function  is decentralized  to mul-
tiple  routers.  As suggested by McKie-Mason and  Varian[10], there  is no longer a single "visible
hand",  rather  a large  number  of hierachically  organized  invisible  hands9.
In  the  airlines  industry,  dispatch  is also  decentralized  to  each  airport,  with  coordination
through  conventions  and  rules.
4.2  Congestion  Pricing
Marginal  congestion  pricing has users pay for the marginal  externalities  they  are creating.  The
competitive  equilibrium  then  decentralizes  the  social optimum,  and  induces  optimal  usage of
the  existing  capacity.  The  smart  market  is exactly  the  Walrasian  auctioneer.  This  result  is
undisputed,  and  hardly  new.
For  most  situations  encountered  by  economists,  the  marginal  externality  created  by each
user  is  hard  to  compute.  In  the  particular  case  of power  systems,  however,  the  DC  Load
approximation  provides  a good  approximation  of this  marginal  externality.  Furthermore,  the
value  of the  marginal  externality  is a by-product  of the optimal  dispatch:  a power system that
uses  an optimal  dispatch  algorithm  can therefore  easily implement  congestion  pricing.
Decentralized  congestion  pricing  is not  always  as easy  to  implement.  This  requires more
sophisticated  trading  mechanisms, with  interruptible  service,  etc.  Experience  with the Internet
8 Of course,  the remuneration  can (and should)  depend on the quality  of the dispatch,  for  example  the number
of dispatch errors,  etc.
9  Recent optimal dispatch algorithms  for power  systems also use a hierachical  control architecture.
11suggests  that  such  schemes  are  feasible:  corporate  users  are  willing to  pay  a  premium  for
increased  reliability.  Peak  versus off-peak pricing  is obviously  the  simplest  scheme.
Congestion  pricing may be politically  difficult to implement,  and  unpleasant  for customers.
It was decided in 1990 that  the bulk price of electricity  would be uniform in the United  Kingdom.
Retail  price,  however,  varied  to  account  for  distribution  charges.  Since then,  transmission
charges  have  been  progressively  differentiated  across  regions  to  account  for  congestion  and
losses,  and  further  differentiation  is currently  under  examination.  The  electricity  regulator,
Stephen  Littlechild  reports  ([9], pg  3) letters  of protests  from Members  of Parliament  whose
districts  are  adversely  affected by  the differentiation.
In  the  US,  a major  telephone  carrier  (AT&T)  now markets  uniform  rates,  to  replace  the
peak versus off-peak pricing.  This suggests over-capacity  on the long-distance  network, but may
also  reflect  marketing  considerations:  users  respond  favorably  when  offered  (for a premium)
not  to worry  about  the  timing  of their  call.
There  is currently  no formal congestion  pricing at  airports.  Airlines charge their  customers
additional  flight-time  to  account  for  delays  in take-off  and  landing  due  to  congestion  on the
runway  or at  the gates.  As air-traffic grows, and with  constant  airport  capacity, formal conges-
tion  pricing  will become necessary.  Queuing  theory  and  probabilistic  modelling  have  recently
allowed researchers  to compute  the marginal  contribution  to congestion  created  by an airplane
delay.  Pricing  may  soon follow.
4.3  Competitive  Network  Provision
The  analysis  in Sections  2 and  3 shows that  congestion  pricing  (even optimal  congestion pric-
ing)  does not  imply  optimal  network  capacity  expansion.  If network  provision  is a monopoly,
congestion  pricing  creates  incentives  for under-investment  in capacity.
The  empirical  question  is therefore:  for which  industries  do  we believe  that  network  pro-
vision  can  be  made  competitive?  When  do  the  revenues  from congestion  pricing  exceed the
cost  of capacity  expansion,  so that,  if the existing  network  owner fails to  expand  the  network,
another  company  can profitably  increase  capacity?
One  can  safely predict  that,  in the  long-run,  technological  advances  most  likely will make
competitive  provision  feasible for  all networks.  In  the  short-run,  however, policy  makers  do
12not  have  the  luxury  of experimentation:  they  must  determine  the  scope  of regulation  while
restructuring  proceeds.  We review below the evidence  for different  systems.
4.3.1  Competition  in  Power  Transmission
Common  wisdom  suggests that  the  power transmission  and  distribution  networks  are natural
monopolies.  Perez-Arriaga  et  al.  [13] document  that,  for  many  existing  power networks,  the
congestion  rent  represent  roughly 30% of the  cost of the transmission  grid.  This indicates  that,
while  congestion  rents  may  contribute  to  finance  network  expansion  (as  in  Argentina),  they
cannot  constitute  the only source of revenue  for the  network  operator.
However, we present  a  simple calculation  that  suggests that  congestion  rents  may  finance
new transmission  investments.  Consider  again  the  simple two-node  power  network  presented
in Figure  1.  Denote  /p  =  E-  gw  the  difference  in power prices,  measured  in $/MWh,  and
K  the  capacity  of the  transmission  line, measured  in MW.  As shown  in Section  2, the  hourly
congestion  rent  is R  = K  Ap.
For this  simple numerical  example,  we assume  that  Ap is:  (1) independent  of K  (constant
marginal  costs  of generation),  and  (2) constant  over time1 0. Denote  h the numbers  of hours  a
year  that  the  constraint  is binding,  and  6 the  annual  discount  rate.  The net  present  value  of
the congestion rent is then: 1?  =  hK  'p.  Suppose that the cost of transmission is: C(K)  =  cK.
Consider  now a potential  investor"1. The congestion  rents  finance  transmission  investment
if and  only if:
h >  (1-6)c
-AP
Denote  H  the  number  of hours  in a year,  and  n =  h/H  the minimum  fraction  of the time
that  the  line must  be congested  for the  investment  to be profitable,  that  we call the congestion
fraction.  We present  in Tables 1, 2, and  3 values of the congestion  fraction  for different  lengths
of line.
I 0 If the later condition  is not  met, we replace Ap by its expectation  at the date of the investment.
"Denote  Ko  the  existing  capacity,  and  K  the  maximum  capacity,  i.e, the  demand  at  East.  Our simplifying
assumptions  imply  the  following knife-edge  characterization  of the  socially  optimal  capacity:
Ko  if  c>  1A
K=  Ko < K < k  if  c = hs.
K  if  c < h
13X____  c= 200  c = 500  c = 1, 000
Ap=  10  4%  10%  21%
Ap=40  1%  3%  5%
:  p=  100  0.42%  1%  *2%
AEp-=200  0.21%  1%  1%
Table 1: Congestion Fraction for a 200 km line
l-i  c=200  c  c=500  c  c=1,000
Ap=  10  10%  *26%  52%
APp=40  3%  6%  13%
Ap=  100  1%  3%  5%
Ap=200  1%  I 1%  13%
Table 2: Congestion Fraction for a 500 km line
We consider three values of average cost for transmission lines.  The lower value is $200
per  MW.km.  This corresponds to  the value reported  by the Brazilian electricity company
Electrobras for a 500 kV line.  The intermediate value is $500 per MW.km.  This is slightly
above the average value reported by NGC, the transmission company in the United Kingdom
($400 per MW.km). Finally, the upper value is $1, 000 per MW.km, reported by New England
Power Service in the United States.
We also consider four values of Ap.  The lowest value is Ap  =  10.  The highest value
Ap =  200 is larger than the difference  between the highest bids in the United Kingdom Pool
($190 per MWh) and the average Pool price ($40 per MWh).  The discount rate is 6 =+r)
where r  is the interest, set at r =  10%. The results are robust to sensitivity on the interest
rate.
Table 1 shows that  congestion less than  5% of the time is sufficient for a short line (200
km) to be financially viable for Ap 2 40, for all cost scenarios. Congestion less than 6% of the
time is sufficient for an intermediate line (500 kim),  except for the high cost (Table 2). Large
c=  200  c = 500  c=1,000
Ap=  10  21%  52%  104%
ip  = 40  5%  13%  26%
Ap=  100  2%  5%  10%
Ap=200  1%  3%  5%
Table 3: Congestion Fraction for a 1,000 km line
14price differentials are needed to make a long line financially viable with low congestion (Table
3).
It would be premature to infer from this simplistic calculation that  private investment is
going to flow into electricity transmission.  Policy makers may be concerned by the cost of
coordination of multiple transmission  line owners. In particular, our analysis ignores reliability
issues, that are crucial for transmission networks, as well as externalities between transmission
lines, which imply that  oligopolistic  competition in generation may lead to higher congestion
than a monopoly (see the analysis presented in Nasser [11],  Chapter 5).
The calculation simply suggests that the conventional wisdom might be amended, and that
short transmission lines, remunerated by congestion rents, might well be attractive for private
investors.
4.3.2  Competition  in  Telecommunications  Networks
There seems to be a consensus  that long-distance  telecommunication lines and wireless  commu-
nications are competitive, which indicates that there is no need to regulate network expansion.
Of course, interconnection agreements,  numbering and radiofrequency allocation, etc. must be
regulated.
However, competing telecommunications  networks exert externalities between each other:
users connected to  network A will desire to communicate with  users connected to network
B. This crucial fact, omitted in the analysis presented by McKie-Mason  and Varian [10]  may
induce suboptimal network expansion, as shown by Laffont, Rey, and Tirole [61  and [7].
4.4  Airline  Industry
Even if congestion pricing was to provide  a value for expansion needs, it is not clear  that airports
can easily expand their capacity. Environmental considerations appear to limit addition of new
runways, let alone construction of new airports.  However, advanced-wcontrol  technology may
contribute to increase capacity without physically expanding the airport.
4.5  Regulated  Network  Provision
Regulation of a monopoly transmission company is not  an easy task.  The regulation contract
must induce the transmission company to: (1) minimize the cost of tranission,  while passing
15some  savings  through  to  the  users  (the rent  extraction/cost  minimization  trade-off),  and  (2)
choose the socially optimal  transmission  capacity.  In the United  Kingdom,  the second objective
has proved difficult to achieve (see Nasser  [11], Chapter  6, for an analysis  and possible solution).
In many instances,  the network  is historically  owned by different  corporations.  For example,
in  the  US,  power  transmission  lines  are  owned  by  different  vertically  integrated  utilities;  in
Brazil,  the  transmission  network  is jointly  owned by  the  Federal  Government  and  the  States.
Regulation  of multiple  companies  presents  its  own set  of challenges.  (see Auriol  and  Laffont
[13-)
5  Conclusion
This  article  has  shown that  simple economic principles  apply  to the  use of congestion  pricing
to  induce  network  expansion:  if network  provision  is competitive,  congestion  pricing leads  to
optimal  investment;  if network  provision  is monopolistic,  under-investment  arises.  The  model
is shown to  apply  to abstract  power networks  as well as the  internet.  The  intuition  extends  to
other  congested  networks,  such as gas, roads,  rail,  airports,  etc.  Policy makers  must  therefore:
(1)  assess  whether  network  expansion  is indeed  competitive,  and  (2)  design  institutions  that
ease  entry,  or design  an appropriate  regulatory  framework.
Further  research  should  aim to determine  industries  for which network  provision  is poten-
tially  competitive.  This  involves: (1) theoretical  analysis  of congestion  pricing,  and determina-
tion of the congestion  rents,  and  (2) empirical  analysis of the congestion  rents,  and comparison
with  the  cost  of additional  capacity.  Empirical  analysis  of the  users'  willingness-to-pay  for
congestion  reduction  will also shed light on  the  debate.
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17APPENDIX
A  Congestion  on  a  Power  Network
A.1  Notation
Consider a N-node network. At each node, a non-storable 12 good is produced and/or consumed.
qn and qd are respectively the quantities generated and consumed at node n.  qn = qn  _qd  is the
net injection into the network: the difference  between local generation and local consumption at
node n.  C (q ), and CS,(qd) are the cost of generation and the gross surplus from consumption
at  node  n.  Sn(qs, qd) = CS  (qd) - C (qn) is the net  surplus  at node  n.  With  Cn(.)  convex and
CS,n(.)  concave,  Sn(.,.)  is concave.  q E  RN  is the  vector  of net  injections  into the  network.
Since the  good is non  storable,  the  market  clearing  implies  that:  nq  = Z  .= 1 qd
Suppose now that  the existence of a bottleneck on the network. Congestion depends only
on net injections into the network, i.e., on the vector q  E RN.  Precisely, we denote K the
capacity on one segment of the network, and we assume that the flow  on that  segment can be
expressed as a function Z = g(q), where g(.) is linear.  Denote Y =  K  the total utilization of
the segment. The network is congested if and only if Y = 1.
For example, consider a power network. Under the DC Load approximation, we can express
power flows  on each line as a linear function of the net injections. If K is the capacity on line 1,
for example, we have: Z = g(q) =  'j=fl  Hlnqn,  where H is the transfer admittance matrix 13.
A.2  Optimal  Usage  and  Congestion  Pricing
We suppose the market is organized by a "smart  market":  users report CSn(.) and Cn(.) to
a benevolent network dispatcher.  He then maximizes the surplus from consumption, subject
to the market clearing and network constraints.  We assume that  users truthfully report their
surplus, at no cost for the dispatcher.
V(K) is the net surplus at the optimal dispatch:
maXqn  ,q5,  En=ln(n  )
V(K)={  ~  st  {  qKn=
Denote pj and 77  the Lagrange multipliers on the market clearing and network constraints.
The Lagragian of the program is:
N  N
L  (q,p,  77) =  Sn(qn,q.)  +AE  qn +r7(K-g(q))
n=1  n=1
Under our assumptions, the program is concave, and the first-order conditions determine
the unique optimal production/consumption plan q* E RN:
J  (q~Nq  )-  I  +  77  a  = 
|9  - (q.*)  +  A* - 77'  9gtq )=
The  argument  is not modified  if the good  is storable.
"The  interested  reader  is refered  to Schweppe  et al. [14]  and  Nasser  [11]  for  details  .
18Schweppe et  al.  [14] propose  an intuitive  interpretation  of the  optimal  dispatch  q* E  RN.
They  introduce  the  nodal  prices pn, the  marginal  cost  of a net  injection  at  node n:  the  value
of  the  marginal  unit  J,  minus the  marginal  contribution  to  the  congestion  a-,  valued  at  the
shadow  price  of the  congestion  constraint  t7:
pn  Y - 77 g(q)
,9qn
Schweppe et  al.  [14] show that  the first-order  conditions  are:
aCS,,(qd*)  _9Cn(qna*)  (1)
The optimal  dispatch  is such that,  at node  n, the marginal  surplus  is equal to the marginal
cost  and  to the  nodal  price.
Equation  (1) lends itself to the following interpretation:  the dispatcher  sets the price system:
Pn = pn at  each node.  For example,  a net exporter  into the network  (qn >  0) is paid A, the cost
of the  most  expensive  unit  produced,  minus  7  ,aq.  , its  marginal  contribution  to  congestion,
valued  at  the  shadow price of the congestion  constraint.  In other  words, users facing the  nodal
prices  fully internalize  the  cost of the  congestion  externality  they  are  creating.
The  First-Welfare  Theorem  in  the  presence  of externalities  guarantees  that  users  facing
such  a price  system  choose the  socially optimal  dispatch  q* E RN.
A.3  Optimal  Capacity  Expansion
We now turn  to the incentives for capacity  expansion  generated  by congestion  pricing.  With  a
slight  abuse  of notation,  we denote  7 7(K) the  shadow  price of the  congestion  constraint  at  the
optimal  dispatch.  We immediately  establish  the  following result:
Theorem  1  1.  V(K)  is a concave function  of K.
2.  The  shadow price of the transmission  constraint  is equal to the marginal  value of trans-
mission  capacity (Result  1 in Section  2):
dV(K)
dK  rK
Proof.  Consider  two values K1 and  K2,  and  0 < ca < 1.  By definition,  we have:
MaXq,0,q,8  n==l  Sn(qn, qn3)
V(oaKi + (I1-  0i)f2)  EN  1ss  r  E  q, = O
|aK1  +  (1-a)K 2
Denote  q(K)  the  optimal  dispatch  for  capacity  K.  We first  show that  caq*(KI)  +  (1 -
a)q*(K2)  is feasible.  Since g(.)  is linear:
g[aq*(Ki)  + (1 - a)q*(K 2)]  =  cg[q*(K1)]  + (1 - a)g[q*(K 2)]
then,  with  g[q*(Ki)]  S  Kland  g[q*(K 2)]  S K2, we have:
g[aq*(KI)  +  (1  - ct)q*(K2)]  S  aKi  +  (1  - a)K 2
19Then, by concavity of f(.):
f[aq*(Ki)  + (1 - o)q*(K2)] 2 cf[q*(KI)1 + (1 - a)f  q*(K2)] = cV(K1) + (1 -c)V(K 2 )
Finally, since:
f [q*(aKi + (1 - a)K2)] 2 f [aq*(Ki)  + (1-  a)q*(K2)]
we have:
V(aKI  + (1 - a)K2) > aV(KI)  + (1 - a)V(K2)
which establishes the concavity  of V(.).
To establish the second result, we apply the envelope theorem:
dV  dL  =  K
We immediately obtain the following:
Corollary  1 Suppose that the network is congested, i.e.,  Y  =  1.  The shadow price i7  is a
decreasing  function  of capacity  K:
dl(K)  < 0
dK
Proof.  The proof follows  immediately from the previous theorem. Concavity of V(K)  implies:
d2V(K)  = d 7(K)  < 0
dK- 2
-dK
The previous theorem carries another important  implication.  Denote C(K)  the cost of
capacity K.  As usual, we suppose that  C(.) is increasing and convex. We then have:
Corollary  2  Optimal Capacity Expansion. At the optimal capacity  KI,  the marginal value of
capacity equals its marginal cost (Result 2 in Section 2):
r,(K*)  = CI(K*)  (2)
Proof.  Denote W(K)  = V(K) - C(K) the net surplus from capacity K.  The optimal capacity
maximizes W(K).  Since V(.) is concave and C(.) is convex, W(.) is concave. The first-order
condition then characterizes the maximum:
dK  = 0 = r7(K)  - C(K)
The result is intuitive: a marginal increase in capacity raises the surplus by 17(K). At the
optimum, this increase is equal to the marginal cost of additional capacity.
20A.4  Revenues  from  Congestion  Pricing  and  Under-investment
We define the congestion rent:
Definition  1  The congestion  rent is the capacity times its marginal social value:
R(K)  = K  x R(K)
Suppose now that  we are using congestion as a signal for investment. We could think of
two ways: (1) pay the network owner the congestion rent, or (2) leave all the revenue from
congestion pricing to the owner. With our hypotheses, it turns out that  both approaches are
equivalent:
Theorem  2  The revenues  from congestion  pricing equal the congestion rent (Result S in Sec-
tion 2):
N
1  E  qn*pn  = R  (K)
n=1
Proof.  From equation (1), we have:
N  N  N  a(*
-L Eq.*  p  - MEqn  +  77  Eqn  '9'b,
Using the market clearing  condition: EN  1 qn*  = 0 and the linearity of  g(-)  Z=1  qn*g-  =
g(q*), we have:
N
- Z  Sqn*Pn =-  x 0±+  x g(q*) = 77  x  K =R(K)
n=1
We are now in position to characterize the network owner's choice of capacity:
Proposition  1  Leaving the congestion rent to the network owner induces under-investment.
He chooses the monopoly capacity  KM  that satisfies:
i(KM)  + KM?/(KM)  = C'(KM)  (3)
Proof.  The network owner chooses K to maximize its profit:
.7r(K)  = 77(K)  x K -C(K)
The second-order condition is:
r"(K) = Kt7"(K) + 2r'(K)  - C"(K)
If Kr/'(K)  + 2r/(K)  < 0, which happens if r/'(K)  is small, the program is concave. The
first-order condition is exactly (3). R
Proposition 1 formalizes  Result 4.
21B  Congestion  on the  Internet
B.1  Notation
Consider a N-node  network. A user has utility Sn  (qn)  - D, where q" is the number of packets
sent by user n and D is the total delay experienced by the user. The production cost of packets
is included into S,(.).  We suppose S,(.)  is concave.  Denote K the capacity of the network,
Q =  qn the total usage of the network, and Y = Q the total  utilization of the network.
We suppose that  D = D(Y), where D(.) is an increasing function.
B.2  Usage  Without  Congestion  Pricing
We assume users do not internalize the impact of their own usage on the delay they experience.
Suppose first that  there is no congestion  pricing. Each user solves:
max S(q)  - D
qn
which yields the first-order condition:
S'(q.)  = 0
Since there is no price for consumption, users consume up to the point where their marginal
utility is equal to zero.
B.3  Optimal  Usage  and  Congestion  Pricing
Consider now the optimal usage of the network. A benevolent dispatcher chooses  the consump-
tion plan q* E RN  to maximize the sum of all users utilities:
N  Q
V(K)  =  max{fS.(q.)  nD(K)}
qERNn=K
The first-order conditions yield:
Sn,  (q.*) =  KnD' (QK )4 -kK
Equations (1) and (4) are formally identical: the optimal dispatch q* E RN is such that the
marginal utility equals the marginal cost of congestion for each user.
As in the previous case, we can decentralize the optimal dispatch through prices. We set a
price per packet equal to the marginal externality created:
p  dq  (nD(  =  _  D (Y)
Each user then maximizes:
max{Sn(qn)  -nD'(Y)qn}
9n  -K
Again assuming that users do not internalize their own contribution to congestion ay,  the
first-order conditions are:
Sn (qn)  =*
We find again that  congestion pricing induces optimal usage of the network (Result 6 in
Section 3).
22B.4  Optimal  Capacity  Expansion
Consider now optimal capacity expansion. As in Appendix A, denote C(.) the cost of capacity
K.  As before we have:
Theorem  3  1.  The marginal value of capacity is:
77(K)  = p Q p2K
2.  V(K)  is concave  in K.
Proof.  apply the envelope theorem:
dV(K)  9V(K)  = nD'(Y)  Q  D'(Y) Q
dK  aK  K2Y~~..  K  K
Remembering that:
dY  Q  Y
dK  K2 K
we have:
dK7  dn[  YD'(Y)l
dK  i 
nY
=  -2  n2YD'(Y)  -K  fy2Du(y)
- K2  [2D(Y)  + YD"(Y)I
If we assume that  2D'(Y) + YD"(Y)  2  0 (D"(Y)  > 0 is a sufficient condition), we have:
iA'(K) < 0, hence the second claim of the theorem. T
The intuition is similar to the previous case: increasing capacity reduces delay (congestion)
hence raises the net surplus from network usage. However,  network capacity presents decreasing
marginal returns.  From the definition of r 7(K), we immediately have:
Corollary  3  The revenue from  congestion pricing  equals the congestion  rent  (Result  7 in Sec-
tion 3):
pQ=Kx  77(K)
We then  determine  the  socially optimal  capacity:
Corollary  4  The socially optimal  capacity K*  satisfies  (Result  5 in Section  3):
??(K*)  = C'(K*)  (5)
Proof.  As before,  the  social  welfare  is:  W(K)  =  V(K)  - C(K).  With  V(K)  concave  and
C(K)  convex, the  program  is concave.  The  first-order  condition  (5)  immediately  follows. U
23B.5  Congestion  Rent and  Optimal Network  Expansion
Consider now the choice of capacity K by network providers. MacKie-Mason and Varian [10]
assume that  competing network providers compete by offering  a pair delay and price to users.
Formally, the timing is: at date t =  1, each network provider offers a pair (p(D),  D); at date
t =  2, users choose their network, and their usage on the network.  The following  proposition
characterizes the outcome of such competition:
Proposition  2  (MacKie-Mason  and Varian) The private optimum perfectly decentralizes  the
social optimum:  (1) the private pricing rule is the optimal pricing rule, and (2) the private
expansion rude  is the optimal expansion  rule (Result 8 in Section 3).
Proof.  McKie-Mason  and Varian [10]  suppose a symmetric equilibrium: all network providers
offer the same pair (d,p(D)).  If delay increases, the price decreases: p'(D) S 0.  Let us first
examine the consumer problem. The consumer chooses a network D, and a consumption qn:
max{u(qn)  - D - p(D)q.}
The first-order conditions are:
= p(D) {  -1  = p'(D)q,
Adding up the later first-order conditions, we obtain:
-n  = p'(D)Q  (6)
Equation  (6) pins down p'(D).  With  a limit condition,  such as p(oo)  =  0, consumer
optimization determines p(D).  Network providers then simply choose D, or equivalently K
and Q:
maxp(D(T))Q  - C(K)
The first-order conditions are: {  =0=  p' (D(Y))D'(Y)Y  + p(D(Q))
=0=  -p'(D(Y))D'(Y)Y2  - CK(K)
Substituting (6) into  =  0, we obtain the private pricing rule:
p(D) =  KD'(Y)
This is exactly the optimal pricing rule.
Then, multiplying (6) and the pricing rule, we obtain:
-p' (D)D'(Y)Y  = p(D)
Substituting into  0, we obtain the private expansion rule:
p(D)-K=  CK(K)
24This is exactly the optimal expansion rule (5).
U
MacKie-Mason  and Varian [10] also observe that,  with constant marginal costs C' = c, the
marginal equation (5) implies:
w'(K)  =  k(p(D)X-cK)
They conclude that,  if the marginal profit is positive, the revenues from congestion fees
exceed the cost of capacity expansion. This is true if the fixed-costs of capacity expansion are
equal to zero. With positive fixed costs, the equality at the margin does not necessarily imply
equality of the functions.
B.6  Congestion  Rent  and  Under-investment
The above result stands in sharp contrast with the analysis presented for power networks. The
crucial difference between both models is the assumption by MacKie-Mason and Varian [101
that  network providers compete to offer service. Suppose instead that  the network provider is
a monopoly, and further assume that the regulator imposes he charges the optimal congestion
price p = MDY(Y). We have:
Propositioft  3  The monopolist network provider underinvests in capacity ezpansion (Result 8
in Section 3).
Proof.  From Corollary 3, the monopolist revenue is:
R(K)  = 7(K)K
As before, the marginal revenue for the monopolist is:
R'(K)  = 77(K) + Ki7'(K)
With i'(K)  < 0, underinvestment obtains. K
In other words, MacKie-Mason  and Varian [10]  show that,  if network provision is competi-
tive, congestion pricing leads to optimal expansion. K






gW  <  gEFigure 2: Optimal Dispatch
- dE  - 1 E
w  E
K
qw =K  qE  I-  K
q(7K  =gE  -gWFigure 3: Marginal  Value of
Capacity
K  1
_()  =E  gw  qw
L  I~~ qw
5(K) -gE  - gw~~~~~~~  -K
\~~
/  \~~~~~7
CDPolicy Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1869 Risk Reducation  and Public  Spending  Shantayanan  Devarajan  January  1998  C. Bernardo
Jeffrey  S. Hammer  31148
WPS1870 The Evolution  of Poverty  and  Raji  Jayaraman  January  1998  P. Lanjouw
Inequality  in Indian  Villages  Peter Lanjouw  34529
WPS1871  Just How Big Is Global  Production  Alexander  J. Yeats  January  1998  L.  Tabada
Sharing?  36896
WPS1872 How Integration  into the Central  Ferdinand  Bakoup  January  1998  L. Tabada
African Economic  and Monetary  David  Tarr  36896
Community  Affects  Cameroon's
Economy:  General  Equilibrium
Estimates
WPS1873 Wage Misalignment  in CFA  Countries:  Martin  Rama  January  1998  S. Fallon
Are Labor  Market  Policies  to Blame?  38009
WPS1  874 Health Policy  in Poor Countries:  Deon  Filmer  January  1998  S. Fallon
Weak Links  in the Chain  Jeffrey  Hammer  38009
Lant  Pritchett
WPS1875 How Deposit  Insurance  Affects  Robert  Cull  January  1998  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Financial  Depth  (A Cross-Country  37644
Analysis)
WPS1876 Industrial  Pollution  in Economic  Hemamala  Hettige  January  1998  D. Wheeler
Development  (Kuznets  Revisited)  Muthukumara  Mani  33401
David  Wheeler
WPS1877  What Improves  Environmental  Susmita  Dasgupta  January  1998  D. Wheeler
Performance?  Evidence  from  Hemamala  Hettige  33401
Mexican  Industry  David  Wheeler
WPSI 878 Searching  for Sustainable  R. Marisol  Ravicz  February  1998  M. Ravicz
Microfinance:  A Review  of Five  85582
Indonesian  Initiatives
WPS1879 Relative  prices  and Inflation  in  Przemyslaw  Wozniak  February  1998  L. Barbone
Poland,  1989-97:  The Special  Role  32556
of Administered  Price Increases
WPS1880 Foreign  Aid and Rent-Seeking  Jakob  Svensson  February  1998  R. Martin
39065
WPS1881 The  Asian Miracle  and Modern  Richard  R. Nelson  February  1998  C. Bernardo
Growth  Theory  Howard  Pack  31148
WPS1882 Interretional  Resource  Transfer  and  Toshihiko  Kawagoe  February  1998  R. Martin
Economic  Growth  in Indonesia  39065Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1883 Intersectoral  Resource  Allocation  and Fumihide  Takeuchi  February  1998  K. Labrie
Its Impact  on Economic  Development  Takehiko  Hagino  31001
in the Philippines
WPS1884 Fiscal  Aspects  of Evolving  David  E. Wildasin  February  1998  C. Bernardo
Federations:  Issues  for Policy  and  31148
Research
WPS1885 Aid, Taxation,  and Development:  Christopher  S. Adam  February  1998  K. Labrie
Analytical  Perspectives  on Aid  Stephen  A. O'Connell  31001
Effectiveness  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
WPS1886 Country  Funds  and  Asymmetric  Jeffrey  A. Frankel  February  1998  R. Martin
Information  Sergio  L. Schmukler  39065
WPS1887 The  Structure  of Derivatives  George  Tsetsekos  February  1998  P. Kokila
Exchanges:  Lessons  from Developed Panos  Varangis  33716
and Emerging  Markets
WPS1888 What Do Doctors  Want? Developing Kenneth  M. Chomitz  March  1998  T. Charvet
Incentives  for Doctors  to Serve  in  Gunawan  Setiadi  87431
Indonesia's  Rural and Remote  Areas  Azrul  Azwar
Nusye  Ismail
Widiyarti
WPS1889 Development  Strategy  Reconsidered:  Toru Yanagihara  March 1998  K. Labrie
Mexico,  1960-94  Yoshiaki  Hisamatsu  31001
WPS1890 Market  Development  in the United  Andrej  Juris  March  1998  S. Vivas
Kingdom's  Natural  Gas  Industry  82809
WPS1891  The Housing  Market  in the Russian  Alla K. Guzanova  March  1998  S. Graig
Federation:  Privatization  and Its  33160
Implications  for Market  Development
WPS1892  The Role  of Non-Bank  Financial  Dimitri  Vittas  March  1998  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Intermediaries  (with Particular  38526
Reference  to Egypt)
WPS1893 Regulatory  Controversies  of Private  Dimitri  Vittas  March  1998  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Pension  Funds  38526
WPS1894  Applying  a Simple  Measure  of Good  Jeff Huther  March  1998  S. Valle
Governance  to the Debate  on Fiscal  84493
Decentralization
WPS1895  The Emergence  of Markets  in the  Andrej  Juris  March 1998  S. Vivas
Natural  Gas Industry  82809